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Standard-less Intermediate Scrutiny of Gender-Based Affirmative Action Programs: 
The Right Man for the Job? 
Emily Montagna* 
 
I.     INTRODUCTION 
 A circuit split exists between the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits regarding the correct level 
of constitutional scrutiny to be applied to Equal Protection challenges of gender-based 
affirmative action programs in the context of employment.1  Although the cases forming the split 
date back to more than twenty years ago, this issue is still important and relevant, as women have 
not yet obtained total equality in the employment arena.  Since the 1960s, affirmative action 
programs have been implemented in an attempt to rectify the gender disparity, but the Supreme 
Court has yet to establish a defined method of appraising such programs. 
 In Brunet v. City of Columbus, the Sixth Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Corporation to mean that gender-based preferences are subject to the 
same standard of strict scrutiny as race-based programs.2  In Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, 
the Eleventh Circuit rejected that reading of Croson and maintained that “intermediate scrutiny 
remains the applicable constitutional standard in gender discrimination cases.”3  
 This comment argues for a more scrupulous analysis—one that provides specific factors 
that would help to reduce the possibility of judicial bias making its way into affirmative action 
decisions—a more defined application of intermediate scrutiny.  Such an analysis borrows from 
the test set forth in United Steelworkers v. Weber, a case in which the Supreme Court established 
criteria for assessing a Title VII challenge of a race-based affirmative action plan.4  While the 
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1 Brunet v. City of Columbus, 1 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 1993); Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548 (11th 
Cir. 1994). 
2 Brunet, 1 F.3d at 403.  
3 Ensely Branch, 31 F.3d at 1580.  
4 United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
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Weber analysis was statutory and race-based and therefore different in kind, the factors it set 
forth are equally workable in a constitutional, gender-based analysis.  The Weber Court held: An 
affirmative action plan must: (1) aim to correct a conspicuous imbalance in traditionally 
segregated job categories, (2) not unnecessarily trammel the interests of non-minority employees 
or result in an absolute bar to hiring non-minority people, and (3) be temporary, with an end date 
or goal.5  By simply switching out “non-minority” for “male” in the second factor, the test easily 
functions in the gender context.  
 This comment does not argue for a disregard of the precedent that applies intermediate 
scrutiny as the proper level of constitutional review of gender-based discrimination.6  Rather, it 
argues for an application of the thoughtful decision in Weber, which provides a different lens 
through which to view the development of intermediate scrutiny in Equal Protection contexts 
involving gender issues.  As Justice O’Connor once averred in a concurrence, the Court’s 
assessment of affirmative action plans “attempt[s] to reconcile the same competing concerns”7 
under both Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause.  Since the Court has found the Weber 
analysis competent to assess federal affirmative action plans, the same test could be just as 
functional in assessing similar plans challenged on equal protection grounds.  In fact, the 
constitutional and statutory inquiries already mirror each other in several ways, which will be 
illustrated in the analysis below and furthers the argument that the two should be comparably 
judged. 
 Part II will give a brief historical background of affirmative action and introduce the case 
law relevant in the circuit split.  Part III will provide evidence regarding the way in which the 
                                                 
5 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. 
6 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218 (1976). 
7 Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 652 (1987).  
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constitutional and statutory analyses have converged and the reasons that the Court should 
formally recognize the same standards for both assessments.  Part IV discusses the constraints of 
the current Equal Protection analysis, the gendered barriers it has erected, and the need for a 
more discerning standard so as to more effectively eliminate discrimination.  Part V concludes.  
 
II.     BACKGROUND 
A.   Purpose of Affirmative Action 
 1.   History  
 An accepted definition of affirmative action is “[t]he use of recruitment, incentives, and 
preferences in hiring and advancement to promote members of historically disadvantaged groups 
in education, the workplace, and the award of government contracts” . . . “to remedy the effects 
of generations of discrimination in education, employment, and commercial opportunities, 
particularly on the bases of race and of gender.”8  It was first employed in  President John F. 
Kennedy’s 1961 Executive Order, which instructed federal contractors to take “affirmative 
action to ensure that applicants are treated equally without regard to race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”9  Three years later, Title VII the Civil Rights Act of 1964 established a 
prohibition on employment discrimination by employers of over fifteen employees, whether or 
not they have government contracts.10  Following Kennedy’s lead, President Lyndon B. Johnson 
issued an Executive Order in 1965, prohibiting employment discrimination based on race, color, 
religion, and national origin by organizations receiving federal contracts and subcontracts.11  In  
 
                                                 
8 Affirmative Action, THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (Desk ed. 2012). 
9 Exec. Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (March 6, 1961). 
10 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.L. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
11 Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (September 24, 1965). 
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1967, Johnson amended the list to include sex, requiring federal contractors to make good-faith 
efforts to expand employment opportunities for women and minorities.12 
 2.   How Cases Arise 
 State and federal laws authorize diversity efforts that are implemented in an effort to 
avoid discrimination and open up career opportunities to all classes of individuals.13 However, 
these laws do not typically require educational institutions or employers to establish programs in 
order to create diversity.14  The voluntary implementation of such programs and the decisions 
made as a result are often what leads to affirmative action.15  Affirmative action cases are 
generally brought in two instances: (1) Where an applicant is rejected from an institution of 
higher education, only to subsequently learn that an individual with inferior qualifications was 
admitted; or (2) Where an employee is either not hired or dismissed due to preferences in the 
area of diversity.  The legal claims brought on behalf of the complaining individuals are typically 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection or Due Process claims.  When assessing the legitimacy 
of a gender-based affirmative action plan, the Supreme Court has not required extensive proof of 
a specific factual predicate, but focuses instead on whether reliance on a stereotype could be 
discerned from the statute’s language and legislative history.16 
 In the employment context, affirmative action programs often take the form of 
recruitment and outreach efforts to include qualified women in the potential hiring pool and 
training programs that afford all employees a fair shot at promotions.17  As large companies 
                                                 
12 Exec. Order No. 11375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14303 (October 13, 1967). 
13 Edward Easterly, Diversity Recruiting: How Does Fisher Impact Affirmative Action in Employment? National 
Association of Colleges and Employers Journal (2016). 
14 Id. 
15 Id.  
16 AJMEL QUERESHI, THE FORGOTTEN REMEDY: A LEGAL AND THEORETICAL DEFENSE OF INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY 
FOR GENDER-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS, AM. U. J. OF GENDER & L. 21, no. 4 (2013): 797-836, 828.  
17 Frank Dobbin, Alexandra Kalev, and Erin Kelly, Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of 
Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 American Sociological Review 589 (2006). 
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realize that a workforce trained in a diverse environment is critical to corporate success, more big 
businesses have begun to understand and appreciate the impact of affirmative action.18 
 
B.   A Test for Affirmative Action Plans: United Steelworkers v. Weber 
 In 1979, a challenge to an affirmative action program reached the Supreme Court in 
United Steelworkers v. Weber.19  The United Steelworkers of America entered into a collective-
bargaining agreement with Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation, wherein the parties 
agreed to implement an affirmative action-based training program “to eliminate conspicuous 
racial imbalances in Kaiser’s then almost exclusively white craftwork forces.”20  This plan 
reserved half of the total openings in the new program for black employees.21  One Brian Weber, 
a white production worker in a Louisiana Kaiser plant, requested admission to the training 
program but was passed over, while blacks with more seniority were admitted.22  Claiming that 
he was the victim of reverse discrimination, Weber brought an action alleging that the 
affirmative action program had resulted in black employees with less seniority receiving training 
in preference to more senior white employees, thus discriminating against him and other white 
employees in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.23  Both the District Court and the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that all race-based employment preferences, including those 
resulting from affirmative action plans, violated Title VII’s prohibition against race-based 
employment discrimination.24  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.25 
                                                 
18 Roger Parloff, “Big Business Asks Supreme Court to Save Affirmative Action,” Fortune Magazine, (2015).  
19 Weber, 443 U.S. at 197.  
20 Id.  
21 Id. at 198. 
22 Id. 
23 Weber, 443 U.S. at 199.  




 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan held that “Title VII’s prohibition against 
racial discrimination does not condemn all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action 
plans.”26  An assessment of the plan used at the Kaiser plants led the Court to conclude that it did 
not “unnecessarily trammel” white employees’ interests or require their discharge to make room 
for black hires.27  In addition, it did not create an “absolute bar” to white employee 
advancement.28  Finally, the Court emphasized the temporary nature of the plan: It was set to end 
as soon as the percentage of black skilled craftworkers in the plant corresponded to the 
percentage of blacks in the local labor force.29  The purpose was to eliminate a manifest racial 
imbalance rather than maintain that balance.30  Consequently, the Court upheld the affirmative 
action plan.31 
 The Supreme Court’s review of the plan in Weber gave birth to what is now referred to as 
the Weber test.32  Although the holding in Weber was confined to affirmative action plans 
voluntarily entered into by private organizations, the Court’s decision a decade later in Johnson 
v. Transportation Agency extended Weber’s reasoning to apply to public affirmative action 
plans.33  
 
C.  The Unclear Precedent: Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.   
 In 1983, the City Council of Richmond, Virginia adopted the Minority Business 
                                                 
26 Id. at 208.  
27 Id. 
28 Id.   
29 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.  
30 Id.  
31 Id. at 209. 
32 See, e.g., GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: TWENTY- FIVE YEARS OF SUPREME COURT 
DECISIONS ON RACE AND REMEDIES 73 (2000); WILLIAM E. KAPLAN AND BARBARA AL LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION 171 (2007). 
33 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 669.  
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Utilization Plan, which required prime contractors who received construction contracts from the 
city to subcontract at least thirty percent of their business to Minority Business Enterprises 
(MBEs).34  The plan contained a definition of an MBE: A business at least fifty-one percent of 
which is owned and controlled by minority group members, which includes American citizens of 
who are Black, Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut.35  J.A. Croson Co., a 
primary contractor, failed to designate thirty percent of the value of its contract to MBEs and 
subsequently lost its contract with the city.36  
 In response, J.A. brought suit against Richmond, alleging that the ordinance was 
unconstitutional on its face and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.37  Justice O’Connor 
delivered the opinion of the Court, fully acknowledging the country’s history of discrimination in 
both the public and private spheres but declining to allow “generalized assertions” of such 
discrimination justify the city’s strict racial quota.38  The Court noted that the thirty percent quota 
could not be tied to any particular injury suffered by anyone.39  However, the Court’s holding did 
not entirely foreclose the imposition of race-based regulations: Justice O’Connor explained that 
evidence of systematic exclusion of minority businesses from subcontracting opportunities could 
have given Richmond the authority to take steps to end that exclusion, and that occasionally, 
some form of narrowly tailored racial preference might be necessary to break down patterns of 
extreme deliberate exclusion.40   
 
 
                                                 
34 Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477 (1989). 
35 Id. at 478.  
36 Id. at 483.  
37 Id.  
38 Id. at 499. 
39 Id. at 552.  
40 Weber, 443 U.S. at 509.  
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D.   Creation of the Split: Differing Interpretations of Croson 
 1.   Brunet v. City of Columbus 
 In both 1980 and 1984, petitioner Brunet took the Columbus firefighter examination and 
was not selected as a firefighter either time.41  The examination consisted of a physical capability 
test (PCT) and a cognitive ability test (CAT), which was a written examination that included a 
mechanical reasoning test.42  In 1984, Brunet and three other women sued the city, claiming that 
the PCT and the mechanical reasoning portion of the CAT violated Title VII because they had a 
disparate impact on female candidates and were not job related.43  The plaintiffs included an 
Equal Protection claim in their complaint, alleging that the city intentionally discriminated 
against female firefighter candidates.44 
 The District Court held that Brunet did not satisfy her burden of proof on the Equal 
Protection claim and did not find that the mechanical reasoning test had had a disparate impact 
on female candidates.45  Nevertheless, the court agreed that the PCT did have such an impact, 
and held that the city failed to successfully demonstrate that the physical portion was job 
related.46   
 The firefighters appealed, resulting in a settlement between the women and the City in 
the form of a consent decree.47  The decree provided that the for the next twenty years, City 
Safety Director would appoint male and female applicants in proportion to the relative number of 
males and females receiving passing scores on the firefighter entry level test as a whole.48  In 
                                                 
41 Brunet at 393.  
42 Id. at 393. 
43 Id. at 394.  
44 Id.   
45 Id.  
46 Id.  
47 Brunet at 395. 
48 Id.  
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response, three male firefighters filed an Equal Protection challenge to the hiring process, 
alleging discrimination on the basis of their gender.49  
 After determining that the consent decree violated the Equal Protection Clause by 
discriminating against the male firefighters on the basis of their gender, the District Court set it 
aside and ordered that the City could no longer select firefighters in the manner provided for by 
the decree.50  In assessing whether the District Court erred in their Equal Protection 
determination, the Sixth Circuit cited the Croson Court’s conclusion that race-based set aside 
programs undertaken by municipalities are subject to strict scrutiny and must be narrowly 
tailored to remedy prior discrimination in order to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause.51   
Pulling from that authority, the Sixth Circuit then decided: “Gender based preferences are 
likewise subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.”52 
 In some cases, this court’s decision to level up and place gender on the same playing field 
as race might seem like a victory for women historically discriminated against, but not in this 
case.  The court’s application of strict scrutiny led it to look carefully for the alleged disparity of 
women in the position of firefighter, but the court did not find such disparity.53  The Sixth Circuit 
reiterated that had disparity been found, “mere statistical imbalance alone would not suffice.”54 
Thus, the District Court reasoned that the City, in agreeing to the consent order, intentionally 
discriminated against and violated the Equal Protection rights of male applicants because it was 
not narrowly tailored to remedy the prior discrimination found in Brunet.55   
 
                                                 
49 Id.  
50 Id.  
51 Id. at 403. 
52 Id.  
53 Brunet at 403.  
54 Id. at 403 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 501).  
55 Brunet at 403.  
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        2.   Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels 
 The City of Birmingham, Alabama, and the Personnel Board of Jefferson County were 
both tasked with the hiring and promotion of local government employees.56  In accordance with 
state law, the Board administered, among other job selection procedures, written tests that 
produced a pool of certified candidates for any particular position.57 After ranking the passing 
applicants, the Board sent a list of the most qualified candidates to the City to conduct a final 
selection.58 
 Litigation in response to this system began two decades ago, when the United States and 
private parties alleged that the Board violated the Equal Protection Clause by using 
discriminatory means in determining hiring and promotion eligibility and using similar means 
when picking individuals from the lists sent to it by the Board.59  Two consent decrees were 
negotiated by the original parties, which required the City and the Board to “certify blacks and 
women either according to racial and gender quotas set forth in the decree or in proportion to 
their representation in the applicant pool, whichever was higher.”60  Once the proportion of 
blacks and women employed by the City in any given job classification “approximated the 
respective percentages of blacks and women in the civilian labor force of Jefferson County,” the 
Board agreed to end the certification procedure delineated in the decree.61  
 The two decrees settled the issues between the original parties, but they were soon 
challenged—the new plaintiffs contending that the decrees would negatively impact their 
employment opportunities.62  After conducting an analysis of the race-based gender preferences, 
                                                 
56 Ensley Branch, 31 F.3d at 1552.  
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58 Id. 
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60 Ensley Branch, 31 F.3d at 1556.  
61 Id.  
62 Id. at 1557.  
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the court moved on to consider whether the gender preferences in the decrees required 
modification to comport with existing constitutional standards.63  The Eleventh Circuit 
acknowledged the suggestion in recent cases that “Croson changed the rule,” making gender-
based affirmative action now subject to strict scrutiny.64  Although the court noted the following 
of that rule in several cases, it maintained, “Nothing in Croson suggests that the Supreme Court 
intended sub silentio to strike down its own decisions applying intermediate scrutiny to gender 
classifications.”65  Here, the court was referring to Califano v. Webster, a case that involved a 
gender-based system for the  allocation of Social Security old-age insurance.66  The court 
interpreted Califano as controlling precedent and maintained that, in gender discrimination cases, 
intermediate scrutiny undoubtedly remains the applicable constitutional standard.67  However, 
the Califano case did not discuss gender-based preferences in hiring or employment, as is the 
issue here, and a gender-based system allocating insurance benefits arguably does not fall under 
the definition of affirmative action, as it does not promote individuals in education, the 
workplace, or in the award of government contracts.  Moreover, the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in 
Brunet made it clear that it did not interpret Califano in the same way, which demonstrates that 
the Califano decision was not as clear cut as the Ensley Branch Court suggested. 
 
 3.   Other Circuits Involved in the Split 
 In Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. City of Philadelphia, the Third 
Circuit sided with the Eleventh Circuit’s position on the proper level of scrutiny to be applied to 
                                                 
63 Id. at 1579.  
64 Id.  
65 Id.  
66 Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 314 (1997). 
67 Ensley Branch, 31 F.3d at 1580.  
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gender-based affirmative action in the employment context.68  The court heard an Equal 
Protection challenge by a group of construction contractors against a Philadelphia ordinance that 
created preferences in city contracting for businesses owned by racial and ethnic minorities, 
women, and handicapped persons.69  The ordinance provided that businesses owned by racial 
minorities and women are rebuttably presumed to be disadvantaged.70  In determining which 
level of constitutional scrutiny to apply to the challenge, the Third Circuit decided on 
intermediate scrutiny, stating that it “follow[ed] logically from Croson.”71 
 
E.   Continuing Relevance 
 This circuit split was created more than two decades ago.  Nevertheless, it is still as 
relevant as it was in 1994, when the Eleventh Circuit decided Ensley Branch and established a 
split with the Sixth Circuit.  While society has seen increasing efforts to eliminate sex 
discrimination in the workplace, it was not until quite recently in our nation’s history that 
gender-based discrimination began to be seen as a pressing issue in need of remediation.  
 The official recognition of that need came in the form of a 1976 Supreme Court case, 
Craig. v. Boren.72  The Craig case, which had the court scrutinize a gender-based age differential 
for the purchase of alcohol, ultimately set the precedent that gender-based classification would 
be subject to a type of intermediate scrutiny, meaning that in order to pass muster, a challenged 
law must further an important government interest by means that are substantially related to that  
                                                 
68 Contractors’ Ass’n of E. Pa. v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 993 (3d. Cir. 1993).  
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 994.  
71 Id. at 1001.  




interest.73  In 1982, in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, the Court supplemented that 
standard by requiring the party seeking to uphold a gender-based classification to shoulder the 
burden of showing an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for the classification.74  These cases 
came several years after strict scrutiny was established as the proper standard for race-based 
classifications.75  Despite the wait, Craig and MUW emphasized that gender-based classifications 
were a reality, and that the court felt the need to offer them a special sort of protection, even if 
not in as heightened a form as strict scrutiny.  
 However, courts still struggle with the application of intermediate scrutiny.  Critics of the 
standard call it unworkable and cite the trouble that lower courts have had with applying it.76  
It is a little difficult for judges to determine whether a state interest 
is important enough to satisfy intermediate scrutiny. It is even 
more difficult for judges to determine whether the gender 
classification is substantially related to that important 
governmental interest.77 
 
Indeed, Justice Rehnquist drove that point home in his dissent in Craig v. Boren, deeming 
intermediate scrutiny “so diaphanous and elastic as to invite subjective judicial preferences or 
prejudices.”78  Although this is not the only common criticism of intermediate scrutiny,79 it is a 
                                                 
73 Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.   
74 Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).  
75 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (In a now overruled case, the Supreme Court held that 
classifications based on suspect classes, in this case race, would only be upheld if found to serve a compelling 
governmental interest in a way that is narrowly tailored to achieve that goal or interest. While the decision is now 
infamous, the standard itself has remained intact since). 
76 ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, TWO DECADES OF INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY: EVALUATING EQUAL PROTECTION FOR 
WOMEN CENTENNIAL PANEL, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 11 (1997-1998). 
77 Id. at 14. 
78 Craig, 429 U.S. at 221. 
79 QUERESHI, THE FORGOTTEN REMEDY, AM. U. J. OF GENDER & L. 21, 822 (Categorical criticism in the form of 
doctrinal arguments that strict scrutiny is the correct approach based on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence; 
insufficient protection arguments that intermediate scrutiny is insufficient to guard against invidious or 
discriminatory statutes; stigmatic arguments that a lower level of scrutiny implicitly delivers a message that women 
are less important than other minority groups; and inconsistency arguments that the Court’s jurisprudence with 
regard to racial and gender-based affirmative action is theoretically inconsistent based on the Equal Protection 
Clause’s original intention to aid African-Americans.  These criticisms, however, are commonly followed by a push 
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material one that could be effectively remedied with the application of the Weber test.  Justice 
Rehniquist’s concerns about the imposition of judicial predispositions would be easily assuaged 
with an application of the clearly defined Weber factors.  
  
III.    CORRECTIVE CONVERGENCE  
A.   “The Same Competing Concerns:” Title VII and Equal Protection  
 At the outset of the Court’s decision in Weber, Justice Brennan clarified that because the 
affirmative action plan at issue did not involve state action, the case did not involve a potential 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.80  This clarification 
disposed of the need for the application of any level of constitutional scrutiny that the Court 
would normally apply in the face of an equal protection challenge.  However, that distinction 
does mean that statutory challenges are shielded from adhering to constitutional ramifications.81  
Nor does it mean that constitutional assessment cannot and has not borrowed from similar 
statutory assessments.82  Justice O’Connor said it best in her Johnson concurrence when, upon 
noticing the similar aims sought by courts operating under the two different laws, she averred: “I 
see little justification for the adoption of different standards for affirmative action under Title VII 
and the Equal Protection Clause.”83  
                                                 
toward applying strict scrutiny to gender-based affirmative action programs, which this note does not advocate for) 
(internal citations omitted). 
80 Weber, 443 U.S. at 200. 
81 See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 664 ([I]t is most unlikely that Title VII was intended to place a lesser restraint on 
discrimination by public actors than is established by the Constitution) (White J., dissenting).  
82 WILLIAM E. KAPLAN AND BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION 527 (2007) (“Although the Court in 
Grutter did not explicitly apply the Weber test to the admissions procedure at the University of Michigan Law 
school, it stated that narrow tailoring requires that there be no undue harm to non-minorities, and that the affirmative 
action plan be limited in time—two of the Weber criteria”). 
83 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 652. 
15 
 
 The decision in Weber did not address whether an affirmative action plan like the one in 
Weber would violate the Equal Protection Clause if adopted by a state or the federal government.  
Before the decision in Johnson v. Transportation Agency was handed down, one scholar referred 
to Justice Brennan’s confinement of the issue to statutory grounds and hypothesized:  
This method of avoiding the constitutional question would be 
unavailable, however, if a unit of the federal or a state government, 
now subject to Title VII, adopted a Kaiser-type preference. Plainly, 
the Court’s reliance on the state action point is at best a delaying 
action.84 
 
 This hypothesis proved predictive, as Johnson soon settled the question left open in 
Weber and extended the ability to establish affirmative action plans to public employers as well 
as private.  However, the Court did not come to this conclusion on Equal Protection grounds, as 
the plaintiff chose instead to assert a statutory claim.85  Thus, Johnson left yet another question 
open: Would the Court have come to the same conclusion had it not applied the Weber test, but 
rather applied intermediate scrutiny to assess the claim?  The answer is unclear, but Justice 
Brennan might have been attempting to quash that possibility by countering Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence, stating: “[W]e do not regard as identical the constraints of Title VII and the Federal 
Constitution on voluntarily adopted affirmative action plans.”86  While this may be Justice 
Brennan’s view, O’Connor’s aforementioned concurrence and Scalia’s dissent advocated for a 
convergence of the statutory and constitutional standards with which to evaluate the 
government’s voluntary affirmative action plan.87  In his dissent, Justice Scalia averred: “It is 
most unlikely that Title VII was intended to place a lesser restraint on discrimination by public 
                                                 
84 BERNARD D. MELTZER, THE WEBER CASE: THE JUDICIAL ABROGATION OF THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION STANDARD 
IN EMPLOYMENT, 47 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO L. REV. 423, 443, n.98 (1980).  
85 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 619. 
86 Id. at 632.  
87 Id. at 664. 
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actors than is established by the Constitution.”88  The mere fact that two justices could hold 
opposing views on the merits but agree on the conditions by which they should be judged is 
telling.  Nevertheless, Justices Scalia and O’Connor left unanswered what precisely that 
converged standard should entail.  As one scholar noted: “What remained unresolved is precisely 
where the evidentiary bar is or should be: As the debate in subsequent cases revealed, the dispute 
persisted over whether the proof standards under Title VII and equal protection should be 
harmonized.”89 
 
B.   The Evidentiary Enigma  
 This subsection will consider each part of the Weber test and explain how all three prongs 
can be applied to challenges to affirmative action plans under the Equal Protection Clause as 
functionally as they have been applied to Title VII claims.  Indeed, it will show that courts have 
already applied the three statutory factors in their constitutional analyses without explicitly 
saying so.   
 1.   Conspicuous imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories 
 
 The first prong of the Weber test is a middle ground.  In Johnson, the Court reiterated, 
“Weber held that an employer seeking to justify the adoption of a plan need not point to its own 
prior discriminatory practices, nor even to evidence of an ‘arguable violation’ on its part.”90  
Alternatively, while a public employer may not attempt to justify an affirmative action plan on 
generalized assertions of historical discrimination, the employer need only point to a 
                                                 
88 Id.  
89 CHERYL I. HARRIS, LIMITING EQUALITY: THE DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE OF TITLE VII AND EQUAL 
PROTECTION, University of Chicago Legal Forum: Vol. 2014: Iss. 1, Article 1., 112 (2014).  
90 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630.  
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“conspicuous . . . imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories” to give reason for its 
remedial action.91 
 The Equal Protection analysis has similar requirements.  The Supreme Court has held, 
“[S]ocietal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially 
classified remedy.”92  Rather, a public employer seeking to defend its affirmative action plan 
need only show that it has a “strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was 
necessary.”93  
 Some scholars have held that the Equal Protection analysis is more difficult to meet,94 yet  
it would seem that this first Weber criterion simply gives more definition to the showing that 
must be made to pass muster under an Equal Protection analysis.  Under Title VII, any employer 
who wishes to adopt an affirmative action plan must be a part of a traditionally segregated job 
category, which the Court has defined as one in which exclusion is conscious, systematic, and 
intentional.95  Surely this type of exclusion would constitute a “strong basis in evidence” needed 
in the constitutional assessment.  Here, the Title VII Weber test imparts clearer guidelines to the 
Court that can be utilized to ensure more objective decisions in response to Equal Protection 
challenges. The test is practical and workable, and functions more effectively than a “wholly 
standardless approach to affirmative action.”96 
 
                                                 
91 Id. 
92 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Education, 476 U.S. 276 (1986) (A collective bargaining agreement in a school district 
resulted in layoffs of tenured nonminority teachers while minority teachers were retained). 
93 Ensley Branch, 31 F.3d at 1566. 
94 See, e.g., WILLIAM E. KAPLAN AND BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION 173 (2007); ROY L. 
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95 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 668.  
96 Id. at 650 (“Instead of a wholly standardless approach to affirmative action, the Court determined in Weber that 
Congress intended to permit affirmative action only if the employer could point to a "manifest . . . [imbalance] in 
traditionally segregated job categories”) (O’Connor J., concurring).  
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 2. No unnecessary trammeling or absolute bar to non-minorities  
 One critique of the statutory test is that it allows private employers to make use of 
explicit quotas within an affirmative action plan, while the Equal Protection Clause prohibits that 
practice.97  It is true that in Weber, the affirmative action plan set aside half of the spots in the 
training program for blacks, and the Court upheld this racial set-aside method, holding that the 
interests of white employees were not “unnecessarily trammeled” because the plan did not 
require their discharge or their replacement with black employees.98  Moreover, since half of the 
steelworkers in the program would be white, the Court ruled that the plan did not create an 
absolute bar to the advancement of white employees.99  
 While the decision regarding quotas in Weber is inconsistent with Equal Protection cases 
that subsequently invalidated the use of quotas,100 the Johnson Court explicitly indicated that the 
Transportation Agency’s plan was unlike the one in Weber because it does not impose a quota 
system.101  The Court’s determination about whether the plan unnecessarily trammeled the 
interests of non-minorities turned on the fact that the plan did not set aside positions for women, 
and led the Court to conclude that it met the requirement on Weber’s second prong.102  
Therefore, the Court added a restriction to this second prong, which illustrates that difference 
pointed out in the aforementioned critique is not so much of a difference after all.   
 In addition, the Weber test is also in line with the level of scrutiny traditionally afforded 
to gender-based preferences.  Intermediate scrutiny requires a substantial relation to an important 
government interest, and mandates the use of gender-neutral selection procedures to achieve 
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those interests.103  The requirement that the interests of non-minorities not be trammeled in the 
process of that achievement ensures that the goal of an affirmative action plan will be 
substantially related to an important interest.  If a plan that was meant to be remedial functioned 
as an absolute bar to non-minorities, such a bar would amount to an impairment of the 
government’s interest in the equal protection of the laws.  Fortunately, the second prong of the 
Weber test prevents that impairment by setting a clear standard, one that gives more teeth to the 
current requirements under the applicable level of scrutiny.  
   
 3. Eliminating imbalance, not maintaining balance 
 The final prong of the Weber test requires that an affirmative action plan be temporary, 
with a stated end plan or goal.104  In upholding the disputed affirmative action plan, the Weber 
Court reasoned that the plan was a temporary measure, because the preferential selection of 
black trainees would terminate as soon as the percentage of black craftworkers at the Kaiser 
plant approximated the percentage of blacks in the local labor force.105  The Court sanctioned the 
plan’s intention not to maintain racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial 
imbalance.106  In Johnson, the Supreme Court upheld the remedial plan even in the absence of a 
specified end goal.107  The Court cited the Transportation Agency’s express commitment to 
attaining a balanced work force, which led the Court to conclude that it did not have an ultimate 
goal to maintain a permanent racial and sexual balance.108 
                                                 
103 Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.  
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108 Id. at 640.  
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 Although the Eleventh Circuit did not explicitly conduct an analysis in line with the 
Weber test, its consideration of the affirmative action plan in Ensley Branch mirrored the third 
prong set forth in Weber.  The Personnel Board was required to annually certify blacks and  
women either according to racial and gender quotas set forth in the consent decree or in 
proportion to their representation in the applicant pool, whichever was higher.109  The court 
noted that the Board “agreed to continue to certify according to these annual ‘goals’ until 
satisfaction of the long-term ‘goal,’” which would be realized when the proportion of blacks and 
women employed by the City in any given job classification “approximated the respective 
percentages of blacks and women in the civilian labor force of Jefferson County.”110  
Nevertheless, the court struck down the decree because it did not state that the race- and gender-
conscious certification requirements would terminate with the development of lawful selection 
procedures.111  Therefore, the court observed, the certification method “could potentially have 
continued forever.”112  
 Notwithstanding the difference in outcomes between the Weber and Ensley Branch 
decisions, the Eleventh Circuit still took a prong of the Weber test into account in its analysis of 
the challenged plan.  Thus, Ensley Branch was yet another illustration of the Weber test’s 
functionality in the Equal Protection context, and further justified Justice O’Connor’s sensible 
assertion that both the constitutional and statutory assessments deal with the “same competing 
concerns.”  
 
4.   Further Support for Combining the Two Analyses 
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 One case out of the Eighth Circuit lends further backing to the proposition of combining 
the statutory and constitutional assessments.  In Valentine v. Smith, Valentine was a rejected 
white job applicant who brought an Equal Protection action in response to the affirmative action 
program in place Arkansas State University.113  The faculty hiring program had been 
implemented as part of a court-ordered desegregation plan for the Arkansas state college and 
university system.114  Interestingly, the court did not apply strict scrutiny in its analysis of the 
affirmative action plan.  Instead, it focused on the existence of racial imbalance in the relevant 
job category, the temporary character of the affirmative action plan, and on the absence of 
unnecessary trammeling on white employees’ interests.115  The Supreme Court’s use of strict 
scrutiny in several subsequent affirmative action cases suggest that this analysis did not might 
not have met the standards of an equal protection clause analysis.116  However, as one scholar 
noted, “the outcome of the case might have been the same because of the remedial nature of the 
affirmative action plan.”117 
  
IV.    WHERE EQUAL PROTECTON FAILS 
 1.   Same Concerns, Different Standards? 
 Many scholars, and even several appellate courts at one time, saw reason to apply Title 
VII disparate impact standards to an equal protection analysis.118  A violation of Title VII of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act may be proven by showing that an employment practice or policy has a 
disproportionately adverse effect on members of the protected class as compared with non-
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members of the protected class.119  Thus, once a disparate impact is illustrated, a plaintiff is able 
to prevail without being required to show intentional discrimination, unless the defendant-
employer proves that the practice or policy in question has a demonstrable relationship to the 
requirements of the job.120  In contrast, the Supreme Court has established that laws that have a 
racially-discriminatory effect are not unconstitutional so long as they were not adopted to 
advance a racially-discriminatory purpose.121  The Title VII standard is a plaintiff-friendly one, 
but the Supreme Court has affirmatively refused to allow plaintiffs bringing Equal Protection 
claims to apply it. 
 In Washington v. Davis, the District of Columbia police department utilized an 
employment exam that excluded four times as many African-American applicants as white 
applicants.122  African American applicants who had been denied admission onto the police force 
sued the department, alleging a Fifth Amendment Equal Protection violation.  The Court found 
no violation, and acknowledged its difficulty with understanding how a racially neutral law could 
be deemed racially discriminatory simply because a greater proportion of the members of one 
race fail to qualify as opposed to members of another race:123   
[V]arious Courts of Appeals have held in several contexts, 
including public employment, that the substantially 
disproportionate racial impact of a statute . . . standing alone and 
without regard to discriminatory purpose, suffices to prove racial 
discrimination violating the Equal Protection Clause absent some 
justification going substantially beyond what would be necessary 
to validate most other legislative classifications.  [T]o to the extent 
that those cases rested on or expressed the view that proof of 
discriminatory racial purpose is unnecessary in making out an 
equal protection violation, we are in disagreement.124 
                                                 
119 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1977) 
120 Id.  
121 Davis, 426 U.S. at 240.  
122 Id. at 237.  
123 Id. at 245.  




 Understandably, the Supreme Court likely does not want it to be easy to prove an Equal  
Protection violation.  Indeed, in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, a sex discrimination case 
decided three years after Davis, the Court held that plaintiffs must prove that legislators adopting 
a policy that would foreseeably injure women or minorities had acted with the express purpose 
of doing just that.125 Reva B. Siegel, the author of Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: 
The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, likened that legislative state of mind to 
malice.126   
 This sort of evidentiary burden, where a plaintiff must establish that the defendant acted 
with almost criminal intent, serves only to dispose of countless cases brought by deserving 
individuals who have little chance of succeeding without the ability to climb into the brain of 
their adversary.  Thus, many plaintiffs who have truly been the victim of discrimination, may slip 
through the cracks solely because the courts demand proof that is almost impossible to put forth.  
In Feeney, the Court cited it its own “settled rule” that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees 
equal laws, not equal results.127  But if the result of a law disproportionately impacts one class of 
people, whether they be of a different race or a different gender, is the law really equal?  
 Thus far in this section, it may seem that I am definitively advocating for the use of the 
Title VII disparate impact standard in all constitutional cases.  This is not the case.  Instead, 
Davis and Feeney were used to demonstrate the limitations on the extremely heightened standard 
in Equal Protection cases—a standard that would benefit from more specific analytical 
guidelines.    
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 Notable, however, is that the aims underlying both the Equal Protection Clause and Title  
VII are the same.  The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race.128  In 
addition, the equal protection component implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment prohibits the United States from invidiously discriminating between individuals or 
groups.129  Meanwhile, the goal of Title VII is to eliminate the effects of employment 
discrimination by eliminating discrimination in employment practices.130  Motivating both is the 
goal of eradicating discrimination.  Therefore, applying a workable test to the constitutional 
inquiry, one that would be effective in eliminating discrimination, would help both the courts and 
potential plaintiffs.  Plaintiffs would understand just what they need to prove in their case, and 
the courts would have definitive factors to focus on in their assessment.  Otherwise, the current 
standard-less approach may continue to prevent justice from being served.  
 
V.    CONCLUSION 
 Affirmative action is undoubtedly still necessary to continue to aid women and minorities 
in obtaining opportunities in areas where they have been historically disadvantaged.  The 
employment realm is one of those areas where an unfortunate disparity still exists.  However, 
there is a continuing need for checks on affirmative action programs that aim to assist 
disadvantaged individuals, and without a clear test, employers that want to implement remedial 
programs have no firm guidelines other than the subjective words used in the definition of 
intermediate scrutiny.  The Supreme Court needs a test that can give clarity to its Equal 
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Protection analysis of gender-based preferences, and the Weber test can provide that precision.  
Without it, judges are free to impose their own judicial preferences on case by case bases, 
because they, too, have little to guide them in their assessments.  The circuit split at issue should 
not be decided in favor of the Sixth Circuit nor the Eleventh Circuit.  Rather, the Supreme Court 
should use the Weber test to inform its Equal Protection analysis in order to ensure that 
affirmative action plans are in place for the right reasons, the right individuals, and the right 
amount of time.  
